The Legal Measures against the Abuse of Separate Corporate Personality and Limited Liability by Corporate Groups: The scope of Chandler v Cape plc and Thompson v Renwick Group plc by Ikuta, Daisuke
DOI: 10.14324/111.2052-1871.079 
	
 60 
THE LEGAL MEASURES AGAINST THE ABUSE OF SEPARATE CORPORATE 
PERSONALITY AND LIMITED LIABILITY BY CORPORATE GROUPS: THE 
SCOPE OF CHANDLER v CAPE PLC AND THOMPSON v RENWICK GROUP PLC 
Daisuke Ikuta∗ 
 
Abstract: While the scope of ‘veil lifting’ has been severely restricted in UK case law, two 
recent notable judgments, Chandler v Cape Plc and Thompson v Renwick Group Plc, have 
held that a parent company could owe tortious liability for the health and safety of its 
subsidiary’s employees. This article contends that the legal principle recognised in Chandler 
and Thompson could successfully prevent corporate group abuses of separate corporate 
personality and limited liability, when combined with ‘veil lifting’ and protection against 
misrepresentation in UK law. With reference to the theoretical justification of limited 
liability, there are three circumstances in which limited liability should not apply: ex ante 
opportunism, ex post opportunism and in relation to involuntary creditors. Most cases in the 
former two categories can be dealt with by applying existing UK legislation and case law 
concerning misrepresentation and ‘veil piercing’. The final category can be dealt with by 
Chandler’s direct tortious liability regime if it is appropriately refined. This paper proposes 
an integrated understanding of Caparo’s three requirements for establishing a duty of care, 
namely foreseeability, proximity and fairness, and four-group categorisation, namely reliance 
on superior knowledge, confusing representation, business integration and fairness for other 
reasons, in which the parent’s direct tortious liability should be recognised. 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As corporate groups have gained power in the global economy, concern has grown regarding 
their abuse of separate corporate personality and limited liability in order to avoid liabilities 
such as tax, tortious claims of personal injury, environmental damage and exploitation of 
workers in developing countries. The typical example of this abuse is a case in which a parent 
company attempts to make itself ‘judgment proof’, which means insulation from judicial 
scrutiny, allowing it to avoid liability or to prevent judgments against it from being enforced,1 
by having the subsidiaries exercise harmful business practices without giving them enough 
assets to compensate the damage caused by their activities. Parent companies are carefully 
exempted from the definition of ‘shadow director’ in the Companies Act 2006,2 thereby it is 
unlikely that they can be liable for damage caused by their subsidiaries as a ‘shadow 
director’. In addition, a direct contractual relationship between a parent company and its 
subsidiary’s creditor is unlikely to be found if relevant contracts between the creditor and the 
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subsidiary, and between the subsidiary and the parent could consistently explain the reality.3 
There are, therefore, extensive arguments which demand exceptions to separate corporate 
personality and limited liability in appropriate circumstances.4 
 Meanwhile, the scope of ‘veil-lifting’, which has been developed by courts to mitigate 
abuse of these privileges, has been severely restricted by recent judgments including 
Woolfson,5 Adams6 and Prest.7 In this context, two notable judgments, Chandler8 and 
Thompson,9 were recently handed down by the Court of Appeal. They held that a parent 
company could owe direct tortious liability for the health and safety of its subsidiary’s 
employees. Although the scope of these judgments has been analysed by Petrin10 and 
Morgan11 from the perspective of tort law, there has been no thorough analysis on this matter 
from a company law perspective. 
 Contemporary scholars such as Hansmann and Kraakman12 have developed the 
argument that the corporate veil should be pierced when, and only when, the third party is an 
involuntary creditor. They define an involuntary creditor as a creditor of a company who is 
unable to assess the risks of dealing with the company in advance, such as a tort victim who 
had no opportunity to assess the risks prior to the injury, and assert that the company should 
not be able to invoke limited liability vis-à-vis the alleged victim to avoid the transfer of costs 
from the company to the victim.13 The meaning of an involuntary creditor, however, may 
require reconsideration as this argument does not seem to straightforwardly justify the 
judgments of Chandler and Thompson. In those cases, the harmed employees could not be 
involuntary creditors in a narrow sense, as they either were or could reasonably have been 
aware of the risks of dealing with the company, including the possibility of serious personal 
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injuries, when they accepted the offer of employment from the employer. Although 
Hansmann and Kraakman briefly mention this ‘voluntariness’ of employees, they do not 
develop a detailed analysis of in what situations ‘involuntariness’ of employees could be 
found.14 Another problem with this argument is that it does not seem to provide detailed 
analysis of the lack of information and ability of ordinary people, such as individual 
consumers, who have traditionally been thought not to be involuntary creditors, to assess the 
risks of dealing with a company. Due to limited disclosure requirements of private 
companies’ information and the relatively weak bargaining power of such persons, they are 
usually unable to obtain sufficient information to assess the risks appropriately. If tort 
creditors should be protected because of the lack of opportunity to assess the risks of dealing 
with the company, contractual creditors who have no opportunity to assess these risks due to 
lack of information or ability also should be protected. Nevertheless, there have been no legal 
measures to achieve this outcome. 
 This article seeks to demonstrate that, from a company law perspective, when 
combined with ‘veil-lifting’ and protection against misrepresentation in UK law, the legal 
principle recognised in Chandler and Thompson could prevent most corporate group abuses 
of separate corporate personality and limited liability, including abuses against involuntary 
creditors in a broader sense, taking the lack of information and ability to assess the risks of 
dealing with the company into account. The legal principle of Chandler and Thompson is 
refined for this purpose, and an attempt at categorising the situations where direct tortious 
liability of parent companies could be recognised is made in order to ensure legal certainty 
and clarity. The article excludes issues related to tax and legislative reform to concentrate on 
an analysis of how practitioners should act based on the present UK law. A thorough analysis 
from a tort law perspective is also excluded, as that analysis is presented in articles by 
Petrin15 and Morgan.16  
 After reviewing the history of UK law on separate corporate personality and limited 
liability in section B, section C investigates the justification for limited liability to show that 
there are certain situations where it is not justified. An investigation into the circumstances in 
and methods by which limited liability should be removed is then conducted in section D to 
demonstrate why Chandler’s direct tortious liability regime should be preferred to other 
alternatives. Section E extends Chandler’s regime by referring to a theoretical discussion on 
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the value of limited liability shown in the previous sections, followed by the attempts in 
section F to categorise the situations in which direct tortious liability of parent companies 
could be recognised. Finally, the conclusion and the remaining issues which should be 
discussed further in the future are considered in section G. 
 
B. DEVELOPMENT OF UK LAW ON SEPARATE CORPORATE 
PERSONALITY AND LIMITED LIABILITY 
    1. Establishing separate corporate personality and limited liability in the UK 
Separate corporate personality, which distinguishes the personality of a company from its 
shareholders,17 and limited liability, which prevents shareholders from being liable for the 
company’s debts,18 were first established in the UK in the 19th century. Before free 
incorporation by registration was established in 1844, a joint stock company was only able to 
be established by royal charter or by an Act of Parliament.19 As Adam Smith appropriately 
pointed out in his Wealth of Nation, a joint stock company was divergent from ‘the general 
laws’ of partnership for the public purpose of promoting some particular manufacturing.20 
About 10 years after free incorporation was permitted, general limited liability was 
introduced by the Limited Liability Act of 1855.21 The establishment of separate corporate 
personality in a modern sense was complete by the end of the century.22 
 Moreover, it was confirmed that these benefits could be granted not only to large joint 
stock companies but also to small quasi-partnership companies in Salomon23 at the end of that 
century. In Salomon, while the Court of Appeal denied the application of limited liability for 
the ‘one-man’ company, emphasising the ‘illegitimate purpose’ of such a company’s 
formation, the House of Lords reversed the judgment, focusing on the formality of the 
formation of the company.24  
This case had huge impacts not only on the development of corporate theory but also on the 
practice of corporate law. It deemed the grant of separate corporate personality and limited 
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liability to be irrelevant to the substantial aspects of the company, such as whether it was a 
joint stock company or a quasi-partnership company, as long as the formal requirements of 
the Companies Act were satisfied. 
 After Salomon, it became quite common for both small businesses and large 
companies to use separate corporate personality in order to obtain the benefit of limited 
liability. This behaviour became especially widespread in the beginning of the 20th century 
as corporate groups gained power in the economy. The abuse of separate corporate 
personality and limited liability by these groups, which employ these legal tools as ‘multiple 
layers of insulation’25 to avoid liability for tax, personal injuries and environmental damage, 
has become a serious social issue.26 Blumberg describes this situation as ‘a consequence 
unforeseen when limited liability was adopted, long before the emergence of corporate 
groups’.27 Indeed, in the early 20th century courts rarely recognised the existence of this type 
of abuse in developing case law, and as a result, they tended to apply separate corporate 
personality and limited liability to corporate groups without discussion.28 
    2. Transition of the case law on ‘veil-lifting’ 
Corresponding to an increase in social concern about the abuse of separate corporate 
personality, the courts attempted to fill the gap between the legal appearance as separate 
entities and the economic reality as a sole entity. For example, in Gilford Motor,29 the court 
held that the competitive activity against the former employer by a company controlled by the 
former employee was in breach of the covenant between the two former employment parties. 
Another example is Lipman,30 where, although the shareholder transferred his land subject to 
his existing contractual liability to the company he had acquired for this purpose, the court 
ordered both the shareholder and the company to perform the liability. Meanwhile, the 
judgment in Knight31 recognised the parent company’s right to be compensated in the 
compulsory purchase process of the land upon which its subsidiary had conducted business 
by seeing the subsidiary as an agent of the parent. 
 This tendency in favour of ‘veil-lifting’ continued until the mid-1970s. Particularly, in 
Littlewoods32 and DHN,33 Lord Denning strongly encouraged ‘veil-piercing’. He noted 
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caution regarding acknowledgement of the benefit of separate corporate personality and 
limited liability for corporate groups, emphasising their nature as a single economic entity. 
This movement in UK case law can be understood in the European context around that time, 
when ‘group liability’ (ie, the liability of companies in a corporate group to provide 
compensation to the creditors of other companies in that group) was introduced in 
Germany,34 France35 and the European Community.36 
However, two years after DHN, the House of Lords restricted ‘veil-piercing’ to 
exceptional circumstances. In Woolfson, Lord Keith expressed scepticism specifically about 
DHN and confined ‘veil-piercing’ to the cases of ‘a mere facade concealing the true facts’.37 
This position was followed by the Court of Appeal in Adams.38 Slade LJ rejected the 
argument of a ‘single economic unit’ with reference to Salomon: 
the court is not free to disregard the principle of Salomon … merely because it 
considers that justice so requires. Our law, for better or worse, recognises the creation 
of subsidiary companies, which though in one sense the creatures of their parent 
companies, will nevertheless under the general law fall to be treated as separate legal 
entities with all the rights and liabilities which would normally attach to separate legal 
entities.39  
On the ‘corporate veil’ point, after affirming the ‘mere façade’ criterion of Woolfson, he held 
that the use of subsidiaries to avoid future liabilities is an insufficient justification to pierce 
the veil.40 He also rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that the subsidiaries had been agents of the 
parent company by pointing out that they were carrying out their own businesses.41 
 Eventually, this unenthusiastic attitude of courts toward ‘veil-piercing’ was confirmed 
by the Supreme Court in Prest.42 In this divorce case, the plaintiff laid claim on the assets of 
the companies controlled by her husband. Although the companies were recognized as a 
trustee for her husband, the Supreme Court maintained their separate corporate personality. 
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Lord Sumption clarified the two principles behind ‘façade’, namely ‘concealment’ and 
‘evasion’, and held that only in ‘evasion’ could the veil be pierced. He summarised this in the 
following way: 
These considerations reflect the broader principle that the corporate veil may be 
pierced only to prevent the abuse of corporate legal personality. It may be an abuse of 
the separate legal personality of a company to use it to evade the law or to frustrate its 
enforcement. It is not an abuse to cause a legal liability to be incurred by the company 
in the first place. It is not an abuse to rely on the fact (if it is a fact) that a liability is 
not the controller's because it is the company's.43  
Davies and Worthington summarise the case law to date related to ‘veil-piercing’ as follows: 
The courts … pierce the corporate veil so as to make the shareholder (corporate or individual) 
liable on the underlying obligation only where the whole purpose of establishing the 
corporate structure in the first place was to help perpetrate the relevant fraud.44 
In summary, UK case law has acknowledged separate corporate personality and 
limited liability as basic principles in company law, and has confined the application of ‘veil-
piercing’ to exceptional circumstances. Although the notion of a ‘single economic entity’ was 
argued by Lord Denning until the mid-1970s, it was rejected in the subsequent cases based on 
Salomon. This tendency against ‘veil-piercing’ was followed by the Supreme Court in Prest, 
and it thereby became more difficult to claim ‘veil-piercing’ in courts. 
    3. Case law on direct tortious liability of parent companies 
On the other hand, some movements which seemed to encourage ‘veil-piercing’ in a virtual 
manner have occurred in the field of the health and safety of employees. First, in Connelly,45 
the High Court recognised the possibility that a parent company could owe a direct duty of 
care to uranium miners of its subsidiary, although the claim was time barred. Second, in 
Lubbe,46a settlement with a substantial amount of compensation for asbestos victims was 
reached in the High Court.47  
This trend was continued by the Court of Appeal in Chandler48 and Thompson.49 In 
Chandler, the subsidiary’s employee, who suffered from disorders caused by asbestos in the 
workplace, claimed damages against the parent company. The case appeared to be the first 
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which actually imposed a duty of care to an employee of a company on that company’s 
parent company. Arden LJ applied the three-stage test established in Caparo,50 namely 
whether the damage is ‘foreseeable’, whether there is ‘proximity’ between the parties, and 
whether it is ‘fair, just and reasonable’ to impose the duty on the party.51 As a result, she 
recognised the duty of care of the parent company either to advise its subsidiary about the 
steps to take or to ensure the implementation of these steps due to the parent’s knowledge of 
the working condition and its superior knowledge about the risks.52 She summarised her 
judgment as follows: 
[I]n appropriate circumstances the law may impose on a parent company 
responsibility for the health and safety of its subsidiary's employees. Those 
circumstances include a situation where, as in the present case, (1) the businesses of 
the parent and subsidiary are in a relevant respect the same; (2) the parent has, or 
ought to have, superior knowledge on some relevant aspect of health and safety in the 
particular industry; (3) the subsidiary's system of work is unsafe as the parent 
company knew, or ought to have known; and (4) the parent knew or ought to have 
foreseen that the subsidiary or its employees would rely on its using that superior 
knowledge for the employees' protection.53 
Although her approach could have the same effect as piercing the veil, Arden LJ rejected the 
view of this approach as ‘veil-piercing’.54 
In Thompson, the possibility of a direct duty of care owed by the parent company was 
again recognised with the criteria proposed by Chandler.55 However, the claim by the 
employee was rejected due to lack of sufficient evidence. Tomlinson LJ stated that the four 
factors mentioned by Arden LJ in Chandler were descriptive rather than exhaustive.56 He 
then rejected the claim of the plaintiff as there was no basis to confirm that the parent 
company, which was assumed to be a holding company not conducting any business at the 
time, had possessed superior knowledge of the risk.57  
As seen above, while the scope of ‘veil-piercing’ has been confined to the exceptional 
‘evasion’ cases in the UK, the direct tortious liability of parent companies was recognised in 
																																																						
50 Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 (HL). 
51 Chandler (n 8) [32]. 
52 ibid [78]. 
53 ibid [80]. 
54 ibid [69]. 
55 Thompson (n 9) [37]. 
56 ibid [33]. 
57 ibid [38]. 
DOI: 10.14324/111.2052-1871.079 
	
 68 
Chandler. Nevertheless, given the four factors Arden LJ mentioned in Chandler being 
descriptive, not exhaustive, the scope of Chandler’s direct tortious liability regime is still 
ambiguous. 
 
C. JUSTIFICATION OF LIMITED LIABILITY 
1. Justification of limited liability and types of the company 
As shown in the previous section, separate corporate personality and limited liability were 
historically seen not as rights but as privileges granted by a state for a certain public 
purpose.58 This means that discussion regarding the removal of separate corporate personality 
and limited liability inevitably involves policy considerations. Generally, a privilege should 
be granted only with adequate justification from a public policy perspective. As demonstrated 
below, however, the justification of limited liability for certain company structures is 
insufficient. 
The justifications for limited liability are generally argued as follows.59 First, limited 
liability could encourage investments from non-professional investors. This is because it 
relieves these investors from worries about their personal assets. Second, limited liability 
could improve the function of stock exchange markets, because, without limited liability, 
investors have to think about the magnitude of other shareholders’ assets in case the 
shareholders have to be jointly liable. Third, limited liability allows shareholders to have a 
diversified portfolio because they do not have to monitor each company in their portfolio 
closely, which could in turn encourage more low-risk investments. This aspect is particularly 
important in large public companies because it is impractical for their shareholders to engage 
in the company management effectively. Finally, limited liability could also benefit the 
creditors of the company because it frees them from having to assess the creditworthiness of 
the shareholders of the company when the creditors seek to enter into transactions with the 
company. 
 Although these reasons are generally persuasive in the case of large public companies, 
they may not be persuasive in the case of private companies. Private companies generally 
assume investments from a limited number of investors who actively engage in the 
companies’ management. Hence, the first and third justifications above, namely the merit of 
encouraging investments from a large number of non-professional investors and that of 
diversified portfolios, are not relevant for most private companies. Moreover, investors and 
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creditors of private companies generally have to be concerned about the nature of its 
shareholders because the management skills and creditworthiness of the shareholders who 
control a small private company are, in most cases, critical to securing payment of the 
company’s debts. This means that the second and fourth justifications above, namely the 
merit that the investors and creditors do not have to consider the nature and the magnitude of 
assets of the shareholders, are also not persuasive in the case of private companies. Thus, the 
justifications of limited liability are far less persuasive for small private companies than large 
public companies. 
 Despite recognising the weaker justification of limited liability among private 
companies, Bainbridge still argues that limited liability could be justified for these 
companies.60 According to him, limited liability should be a default rule even among private 
companies because it is difficult to distinguish cases in which unlimited liability applies from 
those in which limited liability applies. He also argues that, if necessary, the company’s 
creditors can require its shareholders to provide a guarantee for the company’s loan. 
In contrast, Millon contends that all of the justifications above are insufficient in the 
case of private companies.61 He suggests that limited liability among private companies could 
be justified only if the grant of limited liability is viewed as a ‘subsidy’ to entrepreneurs and 
investors. Accordingly, this ‘subsidy’ would encourage entrepreneurial activities and could 
resultantly generate larger social benefits, such as jobs, valuable products and services, tax 
revenues and technological progress. These positive impacts could outweigh the negative 
impacts of transferring risks from companies to creditors. He also emphasises that, contrary 
to Bainbridge’s assertion, the default rule could affect the result of the bargaining prior to the 
transaction between the company and its creditor, according to behavioural economics.62 
It is arguable that Bainbridge’s contention is not sufficiently persuasive. One reason is 
that the existence of a few indistinguishable cases seems to constitute an insufficient 
justification to offer limited liability to all private companies. Another reason is that the 
creditors cannot necessarily bargain with the company and its shareholders equitably, as 
described below. Thus, as Millon argues, limited liability should be justified in the case of 
private companies only if the grant thereof is viewed as a beneficial ‘subsidy’ for 
entrepreneurship. 
2. Difference between ‘Voluntary Creditors’ and ‘Involuntary Creditors’ 
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Once limited liability is understood as a ‘subsidy’ for entrepreneurship among private 
companies, the next issue is to what extent this ‘subsidy’ should be affirmed. Since, as 
demonstrated above, this ‘subsidy’ could be justified in circumstances where the social 
benefits caused by entrepreneurial behaviour, such as providing jobs, valuable products and 
services, tax revenues and technological progress, exceed the negative impacts of risk transfer 
from companies to creditors. Although the quantitative comparison between these impacts is 
difficult, it should be noted that the negative impacts of the subsidy could be quite different in 
the case of voluntary creditors and involuntary creditors. 
 A voluntary creditor can be defined as a creditor who is able to assess the risks of 
dealing with the company and, if necessary, negotiate the conditions with the company prior 
to entering into the deal.63 A typical example is a contract creditor with enough power and 
information for assessment and bargaining. In the case of such voluntary creditors in this 
meaning, there is no negative externality, at least theoretically, because the risks could reflect 
on the terms of the transaction, such as interest rate, the demand for mortgages and that for 
personal guarantees.64 Hence, limited liability could be generally justified because of the 
social benefits of promoting entrepreneurship.  
Although this analysis as to voluntary creditors was undertaken by Easterbrook and 
Fischel65 as well as Hansmann and Kraakman,66 their investigations on the meaning of 
voluntary creditors should be reconsidered. Although Easterbrook and Fischel identified 
employees, consumers, trade creditors and lenders as examples of voluntary creditors,67 these 
contractual creditors are not necessarily able to assess the risks and bargain the conditions of 
the transaction sufficiently. Hansmann and Kraakman advanced the analysis on the meaning 
of a voluntary creditor to some extent. They mentioned some boundary cases, such as product 
liability and workplace injuries, where, while the consumers and the employees were 
contractual creditors, their claims against the company could be based on tort law. 
Nevertheless, while Hansmann and Kraakman identified some general criteria in these 
boundary cases, namely whether the creditors could assess the risks and decline the 
transaction before the accidents, they did not conduct a thorough analysis on the application 
of this criterion.68  
																																																						
63 See Hansmann and Kraakman (n 4) 1919–21. 
64 Easterbrook and Fischel (n 13) 105. 
65 ibid. 
66 Hansmann and Kraakman (n 4). 
67 Easterbrook and Fischel (n 13) 104. 
68 Hansmann and Kraakman (n 4) 1920–21. 
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 Upon further inspection, contractual creditors do not necessarily have enough power 
and information to assess the risks and bargain with companies.69 For example, ordinary 
employees and small individual consumers generally cannot negotiate the terms before 
entering into contracts with companies. They also have limited access to most of the relevant 
information about private companies, such as the companies’ financial conditions, situations 
in the workplace or the processes of production, due to weak bargaining power and 
insufficient disclosure.70 The default rule, which could affect the result of bargaining between 
two contractual parties from the perspective of behavioural economics, as Millon mentioned, 
is certainly more influential if it is set in favour of the party who has stronger bargaining 
power. Thus, even in the case of contractual creditors, a thorough analysis of their bargaining 
power and available information should be conducted in each case. 
 Involuntary creditors can be defined as those creditors who can neither conduct a 
prior assessment of the risk nor engage in negotiations. A typical example is a certain type of 
tort creditors, such as a victim of a traffic accident because they had no opportunity to assess 
the risks and bargain with the company prior to the accident. In this case the disadvantage of 
limited liability, by transferring the costs from the company to the victim, could be 
disastrous. Hansmann and Kraakman suggest that, related to involuntary creditors, an 
unlimited liability regime which imposes pro rata liability on the shareholders should be 
introduced.71 Their argument is that pro rata unlimited liability could enable the company’s 
share price to reflect the true value of its business because each shareholder would be 
personally liable for a tort judgement in proportion to their personal equity ownership in the 
firm, thereby rendering tort claims satisfied.72  
 However, intense opposition has been voiced against the ‘pro rata unlimited liability’ 
suggestion. Bainbridge argues that enforcing such a regime would necessitate prohibitively 
high collection costs, and these costs could rise due to the continuous change in shareholder 
composition. He also emphasises that, from a contractarian perspective, there is no reason 
why liability is imposed only on shareholders among the variety of stakeholders of the 
																																																						
69 Peter Muchlinski, ‘Holding Multinationals to Account: Recent Developments in English Litigation and the 
Company Law Review’ (2002) 23 Company Lawyer 168, 174. 
70 There are some regulatory exemptions for private companies on their disclosure duties based on the 
Companies Act 2006, as well as no mandatory disclosure at stock exchange markets. See, for example, Oury 
Clark ‘Reporting Requirements for UK Private Companies’ (2016)  
<http://www.ouryclark.com/site-assets/pdf/quick-guides/general/OC-Quick-Guide-Reporting-requirements-for-
UK-private-companies.pdf> accessed 23 January 2017. 
71 Hansmann and Kraakman (n 4) 1932–33. 
72 ibid 1933. 
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company.73 Meanwhile, Mendelson rebuts that the ‘pro rata unlimited liability’ regime does 
not reflect the difference between controlling shareholders and small individual shareholders 
as to the danger of moral hazard and the benefits of limited liability.74 She also points out that 
the ‘pro rata unlimited liability’ regime is unlikely to realise full internalisation of the costs 
by controlling shareholders, who are likely to obtain more benefits than they would via pro 
rata shareholding. Among these drawbacks, the most serious problem seems to be that, as 
Bainbridge mentions, without a radical legislative change, involuntary creditors would have 
to bring claims against all of the shareholders to obtain full compensation.75 This could 
impose an excessive burden on the vulnerable party, and thereby could be considered unfair. 
 Contrary to Hansmann and Kraakman, Bainbridge argues that limited liability should 
be generally maintained even in the case of involuntary creditors. He assumes that unlimited 
liability would encourage tort creditors to free-ride the monitoring of the company by the 
contractual creditors, and that sufficient incentives for the company to be precautious and to 
purchase insurance would be created by the reputational risk even under limited liability.76 
Moreover, he attempts to justify limited liability even in the case of corporate groups, even 
though the main shareholders, namely parent companies, do not need to diversify their 
portfolios and are able to create ‘judgment proof’ easily by creating subsidiaries. His main 
justifications for limited liability in the corporate-group case are the following: unlimited 
liability could disturb the role of intermediary financial institutions; it could also raise 
undesirable incentives for corporate groups to transfer high-risk subsidiaries to individual 
shareholders and to conduct unnecessary intra-corporate diversification; in some cases, 
subdivision is required by the nature of the business or the regulation; and separation of an 
enterprise could result in the benefits of specialisation by allowing each subsidiaries to 
concentrate on its own specific business field.77 
 Bainbridge’s argument in favour of general limited liability, even in the case of 
involuntary creditors related to corporate groups, cannot be justified. One rebuttal is the fact 
that he himself acknowledges the weakness of the justification for limited liability in this 
case. Indeed, he fails to persuasively justify limited liability in the case of corporate groups 
using the same reasons noted in his previous discussion on individual companies, which 
implicitly suggests that the justification in the corporate group case is weaker than that of 
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individual companies. Another rebuttal is that most of his hypotheses mentioned above are 
unproven. He does not mention any empirical studies showing the negative impacts of 
unlimited liability on the role of intermediary financial institutions, the tendency of 
transferring high-risk subsidiaries to individual shareholders and the possibility of corporate 
diversification. The function of intermediary financial institutions will not be harmed if 
unlimited liability demands some additional requirements, such as a certain degree of control 
and foreseeability of the parent company. It is also arguable that limited liability, rather than 
unlimited liability, could accelerate undesirable separation of group companies to create 
‘judgment proof’. In addition, unlimited liability does not necessarily harm the regulated 
businesses and the efficiency of specialisation in a wrongful manner. Thus, it is certainly 
undesirable that general limited liability would be maintained in the case of involuntary 
creditors related to a corporate group. 
 In summary, the type of company and creditor involved in each case should be 
investigated closely. Although limited liability is less likely to be justified in the case of a 
private company and a corporate group, the nature of the creditor could also affect the result. 
While limited liability should be generally maintained for pure voluntary creditors, the 
meaning of voluntary creditors should be investigated thoroughly with reference to the 
information available and the ability of the creditor to negotiate with the company. In terms 
of involuntary creditors, both the general pro rata unlimited liability proposed by Hansmann 
and Kraakman and the general limited liability proposed by Bainbridge are certainly 
inappropriate. This is mainly because the result of assessing the social benefits and costs 
caused by limited liability could vary depending on the facts in each case, such as the type of 
shareholder. 
 
D. WHEN AND HOW SHOULD LIMITED LIABILITY BE REMOVED? 
1. Categorisation of the situations where limited liability should be removed 
As shown in the previous section, the value of limited liability varies depending on the 
situation. The type of shareholder and creditor, for example, could both affect the value. This 
section presents a categorisation of the situations in which limited liability should be removed 
and an investigation into an appropriate legal tool to achieve an appropriate result in each 
category.  
DOI: 10.14324/111.2052-1871.079 
	
 74 
 Millon divides the situations in which limited liability should be removed into three 
categories.78 The first category is ex ante opportunism. In this situation, the information on 
which the creditor’s assessment and bargaining was based was wrong due to deliberate or 
reckless disregard by the shareholder.79 Since the assessment and bargaining were not based 
on precise information, the cost of risk transfer caused by limited liability could not be 
reduced. Thus, limited liability should be removed in serious cases, even those involving pure 
voluntary creditors. A typical example is a fraudulent misrepresentation, namely, an instance 
in which the company deliberately withheld relevant information. 
 The second category is ex post opportunism. In this situation, the shareholder has the 
company transfer its assets to others after the parties have entered the contract. Since this 
behaviour incurs a loss that the creditor has not accepted, the negative externality of limited 
liability could exist. Hence, limited liability should be removed in serious cases, even those 
involving pure voluntary creditors.80 A typical example can be seen in Lipman. As described 
in section B, the ownership of the shareholder's land subject to the existing liability was 
transferred to the company. Elliott is another case related to a corporate group, in which the 
company’s property was transferred to its wholly owned subsidiary.81 
The final category is involuntary creditors. Although Millon names this category ‘tort 
creditors’, he discusses their involuntariness.82 As analysed in the previous section, the 
negative costs of risk transfer caused by limited liability could outweigh the social benefits in 
this case.  
 The categorisation resembles the one provided by Easterbrook and Fischel. They state 
that, in US case law, ‘veil piercing’ is likely to occur, appropriately, in cases involving 
involuntary creditors and those involving fraud, misrepresentation and undercapitalisation.83 
Since most undercapitalisation circumstances mentioned could be included in ex ante or ex 
post opportunism, their argument supports Millon’s three-group categorisation. Thus, the 
situations where limited liability should be removed can be categorised into three groups, 
namely ex ante opportunism, ex post opportunism and involuntary creditors.84 
2. Deployment of UK law to remove limited liability 
																																																						
78 Millon (n 4) 1342–1347. 
79 ibid 1342–1345. 
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82 Millon (n 4) 1346–1347. 
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Surprisingly, the first two categories set by Millon, ex ante opportunism and ex post 
opportunism, are already covered under UK legislation and case law. Most ex ante 
opportunism cases could be dealt with appropriately by the case law of misrepresentation in 
contract law and that of deceit in tort law, as well as by the Misrepresentation Act 1967. In 
the case law of misrepresentation, deliberate and negligent false statements, including those 
by conduct, could allow the opposite party to rescind the contract and to claim damages.85 
This protection is reinforced by the Misrepresentation Act 1967, wherein the burden of proof 
is transferred from the victim to the wrongdoer in section 2(1), and innocent 
misrepresentation is granted the potential to justify discretional award in section 2(2). In the 
case law of deceit in tort law, false statements, including those by conduct, could cause 
tortious liability if the wrongdoer knows its falsity.86 Although these legal methods focus on 
the company’s knowledge and behaviour, they could be applied to cases in which an owner 
shareholder of a private company is controlling the company as its director, which is the most 
frequent and serious example of ex ante opportunism. The protection of creditors from 
fraudulent trading provided by section 213 of the Insolvency Act 1986 also deals with ex ante 
opportunism in the course of the termination of the company.  
 Similarly, most ex post opportunism cases can be within a scope of ‘veil piercing’ in 
UK case law. Although Hannigan87 and Matthews88 argue that the criteria of ‘veil-piercing’ 
are still ambiguous after Prest, it is arguable that the requirements and the effects of ‘veil-
piercing’ to remove limited liability have, at the very least, been clarified to a significant 
extent. It can be noted that ‘veil-piercing’ can be recognised when separate corporate 
personality of a company has been abused by its influential shareholder to avoid existing 
liabilities, which will result in seeing the company and the shareholder as a unified sole entity 
in respect of those liabilities. Hence, Bainbridge’s assumption that ‘veil-piercing’ is 
unprincipled and arbitrary89 is not acceptable in the UK. Although the ‘evasion’ principle 
might not include cases in which the shareholder abuses an existing corporate structure to 
avoid existing liability, these cases can be dealt with appropriately by the direct tortious 
liability regime proposed by Chandler if the regime is appropriately refined as shown below. 
The regulations on wrongful trading, transactions at an undervalue and preferences under 
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sections 214, 238 and 239 of the Insolvency Act 1986, respectively, also deal with ex post 
opportunism in the course of the termination of the company. 
 When it comes to involuntary creditors, the discussion about when and how limited 
liability should be removed is still in chaos. As shown below, however, it is arguable that the 
direct tortious liability regime proposed in Chandler is more suitable for this purpose than 
other suggestions. 
Millon suggests that limited liability related to involuntary creditors should be 
maintained as long as reasonable corporate efforts to provide compensation to the victims 
have been made; otherwise the excessive removal of limited liability would lead to over-
insurance in the company and a chilling effect on its business.90 He also argues that the cost 
transfer from wrongdoers to victims by limited liability could only be justified from the 
perspective of fairness subject to this restriction.91 It is questionable, however, how likely 
victims are to bring a claim against the shareholders when the company has made reasonable 
efforts to provide compensation to them. It is also arguable that the boundary of ‘reasonable 
corporate efforts’ could be too ambiguous, thereby Millon’s suggestion could cause 
disastrous confusion in the case law. Moreover, his proposal needs legislative reform because 
it could not be covered by ‘veil piercing’, or by other case law and legislation, in the UK.  
 Meanwhile, Mendelson argues that involuntary creditors such as tort or statutory 
creditors, like employees who have been dismissed with violation of the statutory 
requirements, should be relieved if the shareholder has ‘capacity of control’.92 She proposes 
the use of ‘veil-piercing’ or the legislative introduction of vicarious liability for this 
purpose.93 As Millon emphasises, however, determining the shareholders’ liability merely on 
the basis of ‘capacity of control’ could remove limited liability excessively.94 It is certainly 
inappropriate if parent companies that could not have foreseen the damage at all and, as a 
result, could not have taken precautions against it, were held liable. In addition, Mendelson’s 
suggestion requires legislative reform as it could not be implemented in UK case law through 
‘veil-piercing’. As Morgan admits, vicarious liability of parent companies has been 
recognised in England and Wales only in tort cases caused by a natural person.95 Similarly, 
Muchlinski suggests a legal presumption of the parents’ liability on the basis of their actual or 
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potential control.96 Hence, a parent company could be liable for its subsidiaries’ debts unless 
the parent proves that the opposite party had accepted the express exclusion of the parent 
from the liability.97 The legal presumption, however, could only be realised by radical change 
in legislation or case law. Meanwhile, the same results could be obtained under existing UK 
law with appropriate inference of facts from the absence of evidential submission by the 
parent company, if the requirements of a duty of care are interpreted flexibly as shown below. 
One possibility is that, if the plaintiff requires the parent company to provide evidence of its 
insignificance to the relevant decision-making in its subsidiary and the parent does not 
provide it sufficiently, the parent’s involvement can be inferred, taking the uneven 
distribution of evidence between the parties into account. The Court of Appeal judgment in 
Chandler also mentions the ‘evidential burden of proof’, where, if the plaintiff submits a 
certain amount of evidence on the involvement of the parent company, the parent has to 
prove its irrelevance.98 These methods could induce appropriate results corresponding to the 
facts in each case.  
A more radical proposal is the introduction of ‘enterprise liability’ suggested by 
Muchlinski.99 He argues that, looking at the economic reality of a corporate group as a single 
economic entity, ‘veil-piercing’ should be recognised on the basis of the status of the third 
party related to the corporate group.100 As mentioned above, similar legislation was 
introduced for ‘group liability’ in Germany, France and the European Community between 
the 1960s and 1980s. However, there could be strong opposition against this proposal as it is 
likely to contradict the principle of separate corporate personality by prioritising the 
economic reality to the legal form. Since this argument is not necessarily confined to 
involuntary creditors, comprehensive and radical changes in the legal system related to 
corporate groups would be induced by the general adoption of this regime. Hence, the 
adoption of ‘enterprise liability’, which needs the case law change from Adams, is unlikely to 
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occur in the UK for the time being. It is also arguable that the notion of ‘enterprise’ is too 
ambiguous to be utilised in practice,101 that the circumstances related to the creditors cannot 
be considered in this regime and that the concept of ‘relational law’ is unfamiliar in the UK. 
 While these suggestions have some significant drawbacks, the direct tortious liability 
regime proposed in Chandler could deal with most of the cases in question appropriately. As 
seen in section B, the regime requires both reasonable ‘foreseeability’, as proposed by 
Millon, and ‘proximity’ mainly caused by control, as suggested by Mendelson. It does not 
demand any new legislation or amendments of case law. With minor refinements shown in 
the next section, the criteria could be flexible enough to distinguish appropriately between 
public and private companies and between individual and corporate shareholders, and 
comprehensive enough to include some types of contractual creditors who need to be 
protected. Legal certainty and clarity could be ensured by classification of the relevant cases 
and accumulation of the relevant judgments and discussions, as demonstrated below. 
Although Muchlinski states that proving direct tortious liability of a parent company is often 
prohibitively difficult for victims,102 proving liability could be facilitated by a variety of 
practical efforts such as the use of fact inference by the court, as mentioned above. Thus, the 
direct tortious liability regime could be a strong tool to protect involuntary creditors in 
appropriate cases. 
 In summary, two of the three situations which demand the removal of limited liability, 
namely ex ante opportunism and ex post opportunism, have already been dealt with 
appropriately by UK law in most cases through as the use of ‘veil-piercing’ and the law of 
misrepresentation. The third situation, namely involuntary creditors, could also be dealt with 
appropriately by the direct tortious liability of parent companies suggested by Chandler, if 
the regime is appropriately refined.  
 
E. REFINING CHANDLER’S DIRECT TORTIOUS LIABILITY REGIME 
1. The scope of Chandler’s direct tortious liability regime 
The previous section confirmed that Chandler’s direct tortious liability regime could 
appropriately deal with cases involving involuntary creditors if the regime is refined. In this 
section, the Court of Appeal judgments in Chandler and Thompson are considered to clarify 
the regime’s scope. 
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 In the Court of Appeal judgment in Chandler, Arden LJ first set out the ‘assumption 
of responsibility’, which is required to hold a duty of care for third parties not to harm others, 
as a criterion to recognise a duty of care.103 She confirmed that this criterion involves the 
second and third requirements of the Caparo test, namely ‘proximity’ and being ‘fair, just 
and reasonable’ to impose a duty. The notable point here is that she affirmed that these two 
requirements were essentially the same question, namely whether a duty of care existed or 
not.104 Then, after confirming the unnecessity of the parent’s ‘absolute control’ over the 
subsidiary,105 she analysed the facts in the present case. She found a policy in this group 
which forced the subsidiaries to follow the parent’s directions in certain matters, as well as 
systemic causes of the damage such as the fact that the factory did not have any sidewalls 
despite the danger of scattering toxic asbestos.106 Hence the parent’s irresponsibility for the 
actual implementation of health and safety steps in the subsidiary was not held decisive in 
this case.107 Subsequently, she held that, given the parent’s knowledge of the working 
conditions and its superior knowledge of the risks of asbestos, the parent had a duty of care 
either to advise the subsidiary on the reasonable steps to be adopted for safe working 
conditions or to ensure those steps to be taken.108 Finally, she summarised her discussion by 
identifying four factors which were decisive in this case: (1) the same business in a relevant 
respect; (2) the parent’s superior knowledge on the relevant aspect; (3) the parent’s 
knowledge on the subsidiary’s working condition; and (4) the subsidiary’s reliance on the 
parent’s superior knowledge.109  
 As Petrin mentions, the notable point in this judgment is the manner in which the 
three requirements from Caparo were considered. The requirements of ‘proximity’ and 
‘fairness’ were integrated, and the facts relating to ‘foreseeability’ were also considered. 
Petrin appropriately justifies this approach by stating that there have been many cases, such 
as Reeman,110 where the three requirements of a duty of care were considered in an integrated 
manner.111  
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 Another critical posit in Petrin’s article is that the value of limited liability should be 
considered in the requirement of ‘fairness’.112 This means that the difference in the extent 
which limited liability can be justified analysed in the previous sections could be considered 
in the direct tortious liability regime. Such policy consideration by the court is also 
mentioned by other academics. For example, Muchlinski contends that public policy could 
affect the notion of the duty of care in serious tort cases,113 and Deakin et al state that policy 
consideration by the courts in tort claims is becoming popular.114 
 With reference to these discussions, the scope of Chandler’s direct liability regime 
could be extended as follows. As mentioned above, Caparo’s three requirements should be 
considered in an integrated manner. Since the requirement of ‘fairness’ could involve 
consideration of the value of limited liability, the extent of ‘foreseeability’ and ‘proximity’ 
required could be smaller if the justification of limited liability is relatively weak. The cases 
involving a private company or a corporate group and those involving an involuntary creditor 
in a broad sense could be seen as examples of situations in which the justification of limited 
liability could be weak. This does not mean that foreseeability and proximity are unnecessary 
in these cases. In the individual shareholder cases, it is more likely that the requirements of 
foreseeability and proximity will not be established because of difficulty in collecting 
relevant information and lack of involvement in the company’s decision, although this is not 
the case when the individual is an owner shareholder of a small private company. The 
definition of involuntary creditors does not confine qualifying parties to tort creditors. Rather, 
it could extend to certain types of contractual creditors and statutory creditors who have 
insufficient information and lack the ability to assess the risks of the transaction and to 
bargain with the company before entering the transaction. Employees facing unforeseeable 
health and safety risks and consumers claiming product liability are good examples of 
involuntary creditors in a broad sense because, generally, both have insufficient bargaining 
power and could not be expected to anticipate the occurrence of an accident before entering 
the transaction.  
This approach is supported by the High Court decision of ArmorGroup.115 In this case, 
the confusing use of the group’s and the parent’s names in the course of the subsidiary’s 
recruitment was held as one of the significant factors to recognise the parent’s duty of care 
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for the health and safety of the subsidiary’s employee.116 This judgment can be understood as 
constituting a finding that the misleading information provided by the group before the 
parties entered into the employment contract prevented the employee from assessing the risks 
appropriately, rendering the existence of a duty of care fair. 
2. Appropriate understandings of Chandler and Thompson 
From this integrated approach of direct tortious liability, Chandler could be understood as 
follows: since this case involves a health and safety issue between a subsidiary of a corporate 
group and its employee, the degree of fairness is relatively high. Hence, the levels of 
foreseeability and proximity required should be relatively low. Given the parent’s control 
over the subsidiary, the parent’s knowledge of the working conditions and its superior 
knowledge of the risks of asbestos, foreseeability and proximity were established in this 
sense. Thus, it is arguable that this is a distinct case where the parent’s duty of care should be 
upheld.  
 Meanwhile, in Thompson, the direct duty of care owed by the holding company to the 
employee of its subsidiary was denied. In this case, although the degree of fairness was as 
high as in Chandler, there was no evidence of the parent’s knowledge and control related to 
foreseeability and proximity. Hence, the parent’s direct duty of care could not be recognised. 
Once Chandler’s direct tortious liability regime is understood as above, Petrin’s criticism 
against the judgment in Chandler can be rebutted. He argues that, if the requirement of 
relevant control could be satisfied merely with the parent’s voting rights and the existence of 
group policies, most ordinary corporate groups would suffer from claims from a wide range 
of third parties.117 However, the extent of required control will depend on the degree of 
fairness in each case, so it is unlikely that such a range of claims would succeed. His other 
criticism is that Chandler’s direct tortious liability regime, which does not exclude individual 
shareholders, would have a chilling effect on entrepreneurship due to the investors’ risk to be 
liable for the company’s activities.118 However, as stated above, most of the individual 
shareholders will be excluded as a result of the application of this regime, thereby any 
chilling effect would be insignificant. Although controlling shareholders of small private 
companies could be directly liable in this regime, this result is appropriate because the degree 
of fairness is generally high in these cases. Although Petrin also criticises that the judgment 
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did not require the actual reliance and its reasonableness, particularly by the employee 
himself,119 the reliance of the employee is not always necessary to establish proximity. 
 From the perspective of the refined direct tortious liability regime, the four key factors 
shown by Arden LJ in Chandler should be reconsidered. The third factor, namely the parent’s 
knowledge of the working conditions, could support the parent’s foreseeability, and the 
second and fourth factors – namely the parent’s superior knowledge of the risk and the 
subsidiary’s reliance on that knowledge – could support the parent’s proximity. However, the 
first factor, namely managing the same business, could not have a position in the refined 
direct tortious liability regime. Although Thompson seems to affirm this requirement of 
Chandler,120 this attitude is inappropriate because no holding companies would have direct 
liability even if they have significant control and influence on the subsidiary’s business. 
3. Rebuttal against possible criticisms 
Whilst there are a number of further potential criticisms of the refined direct tortious liability 
regime, they can be rebutted as follows. Possibly the most frequent criticism will be that the 
regime would be arbitrary and harm legal certainty. However, this regime can carefully 
remove arbitrariness as much as possible by putting itself in the existing framework of tort 
law. In addition, legal certainty and clarity could be improved by the classification of the 
relevant cases, as will be attempted in the following section, as well as the accumulation of 
the relevant judgments and discussions.  
Another possible criticism is that the courts should not intervene with policy 
decisions. Although, as shown in section C, the consideration of the value of limited liability 
inevitably involves a policy decision to some extent, this is acceptable because the courts 
intervene in policy decisions only to the extent necessary in tort law, which inherently 
includes certain political goals such as the deterrence of tortious behaviour and justice by 
compensation. It is also arguable that, as mentioned in section B and section C, limited 
liability was historically a privilege granted by a state for a certain pubic purpose; thus, there 
should be policy considerations in judgments on limited liability. If such considerations by 
the judiciary are deemed inappropriate, the legislature can restrict their ability to do so. Some 
might also argue that the refined regime is beyond the scope of the existing tort law 
framework. As shown above, however, it is arguable that the regime can be logically traced 
back to existing UK case law and legal theories. Finally, some might criticise that the regime 
would contradict separate corporate personality, which is one of the basic principles of UK 
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company law. However, this regime does not contradict the principle at all because it imposes 
direct liability on the parent company due to the parent’s own conduct or omission. As Arden 
LJ in Chandler appropriately stated, the parent’s direct liability is not ‘veil piercing’.121 
 To summarise, Chandler’s direct tortious liability regime could be refined as a 
flexible tool to deal appropriately with a variety of cases involving involuntary creditors. The 
significance of Chandler and Thompson could then be understood from a broader 
perspective. Despite the potential for some criticism, such as the lack of legal certainty, 
judicial intervention in the policy decision, and potential conflict with separate corporate 
personality, these can be reasonably rebutted if the legal certainty could be established by 
categorisation of relevant cases, as attempted in the following section, and accumulation of 
relevant judgments and discussions in the near future. 
 
F. CATEGORISATION OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE THE PARENTS’ 
DIRECT TORTIOUS LIABILITY COULD BE RECOGNISED 
1. Four categories where the parents’ direct tortious liability could be recognised 
Consideration of prior cases allows for an argument to be made regarding the existence of 
four categories in which the parents’ direct tortious liability could be recognised. Although 
this categorisation is not exhaustive, it could significantly improve the legal certainty and 
clarity of this regime. 
   a)  Reliance on superior knowledge 
The first category is reliance on superior knowledge. This category mainly includes physical 
torts which cannot be prevented without relevant scientific knowledge such as certain types 
of industrial accidents, product liabilities and environmental problems. Chandler and 
Thompson, where up-to-date scientific knowledge about the risk of asbestos was crucial to 
preventing the harm, could be included in this category. The parent company could be liable 
when it has superior knowledge about the risk upon which its subsidiary relied on, or could 
reasonably be expected to rely on, but does not utilise that knowledge to prevent possible 
harms. Since the victims are generally involuntary creditors, the high degree of fairness could 
lower the requirements for foreseeability and proximity. In addition, the parent’s superior 
knowledge and the subsidiary’s reliance on it could constitute a high level of proximity. 
Hence, it is likely that the parent’s direct tortious liability is recognised even if the degree of 
control was not very strong.  
																																																						
121 Chandler (n 8) [69]. 
DOI: 10.14324/111.2052-1871.079 
	
 84 
The subsidiary’s reliance could be established from relevant facts such as the degree 
of the parent’s involvement in the subsidiary’s business, the method of management of health 
and safety issues in the group and the degree of uneven distribution of relevant knowledge 
and experts within the group. For example, if the parent company has formulated the group’s 
health and safety policy to be carried out by its subsidiaries and the policy failed to prevent 
the harm, the parent is likely to be directly liable. Another example is the situation where the 
parent company has formed a business model based on its superior knowledge, its 
subsidiaries carry out day-to-day operations and the risk is inherent in the business model. 
Arden LJ in Chandler appropriately mentions these situations as a ‘systemic risk’.122 
 The latest case in this category is Lungowe,123 where water contamination by the 
subsidiary’s copper mine injured the neighbouring residents.124 The Hon. Mr Justice Coulson 
mentioned the following factors which could support the parent’s direct liability: the report 
issued by the parent, a holding company, suggested the existence of governance framework 
formulated by the parent to prevent water contamination; the agreement between the parent 
and the subsidiary suggested that the parent provided relevant services including project 
development and management; employees of the parent and other group companies played an 
important role in the business; and the parent had significant control over the subsidiary.125 
Although the judgment did not directly mention the parent’s superior knowledge, the 
involvement of the parent in the subsidiary’s business could suggest the parent’s superior 
knowledge about the contamination risk and the subsidiary’s reliance on that knowledge. 
b)  Confusing representation 
The second category is confusing representation. It mainly includes economic torts, although 
it also includes physical torts preceded by a contract such as product liability and industrial 
accidents. In this category, the party who entered the transaction with the subsidiary confused 
the opposite party as its parent or the group itself at that time due to a confusing manner of 
representation. Although some cases in this category could also be dealt with through 
traditional misrepresentation law, the direct tortious liability regime could satisfy certain 
creditors who cannot be compensated in the traditional framework. 
A typical example is ArmorGroup, where, as mentioned above, although the name of 
the employer, the subsidiary, on the employment contract document was correct, the names 
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of its parent and the group were used in a confusing manner in the course of recruitment.126 
Another possible example is the situation where the name of the parent or the group itself 
were disproportionately emphasised to evoke a sense of security to the opposite party, which 
can frequently be seen particularly in invitations to potential employees and individual 
consumers. In this category, the degree of fairness could be high because the opposite party 
did not have sufficient information to assess the risk of the transaction, thereby the demands 
for the other two requirements, foreseeability and proximity, could be lower. In VTB, 
although the individual controller of the company was held liable for the misrepresentation of 
the company ownership,127 he would also have direct tortious liability if he gave the correct 
information in a confusing manner.  
   c)  Business integration 
The third category is business integration. Although this category can include both physical 
and economic torts and could overlap the former two categories, the parent’s direct tortious 
liability is more likely to be affirmed even if the degree of fairness is not very high. Most 
undercapitalisation cases could be included in this category. For example, if the parent 
company intervenes in the subsidiary’s financial decision-making and siphons profits from 
the subsidiary, the parent could be liable to the subsidiary’s creditors in the event of the 
subsidiary’s bankruptcy even if neither ‘veil-piercing’ nor protection under the Insolvency 
Act 1986 cannot be applied. In cases where an existing corporate structure was abused, which 
could fall out of the scope of ‘veil-piercing’ as mentioned in section D, it is useful for the 
creditors to claim the shareholder’s direct tortious liability.  
Another typical example is the circumstance where a subsidiary is just a part of the 
group business controlled by the parent. If the parent has set up the whole business and the 
business has a ‘systemic’ risk, the parent could be directly liable even if the parent did not 
directly involve the business. The direct tortious liability regime could have applied in 
Kensington,128 where ‘veil-piercing’ was affirmed mainly because the whole group was 
integrated for a single business. Adams could also be included in this category because the 
worldwide production and sales of asbestos governed by the parent company seemed to 
involve some ‘systemic’ problems, such as not warning of the possible dangers.129 The 
judgment in Chandler focused on superior knowledge perhaps because the judges could not 
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find a high level of business integration due to the parent’s withdrawal from running the 
factory in question.  
 Other examples can be seen in US case law. In Unocal,130 the US Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit held that direct tortious liability of the joint venture partner for forced 
labour could be affirmed even if it had only aided the use of forced labour. Similarly, in 
Amoco Cadiz,131 the US District Court affirmed the parent’s direct tortious liability for the oil 
spill, due to the grounding of a tanker caused by a failure of the steering mechanism, mainly 
on the grounds of significant integrity and control. After analysing Amoco Cadiz, Muchlinski 
concluded the following: 
[W]here decision-making is so centralised that major policies could not have been 
formulated or put into operation without the direct involvement of the parent 
company, … the parent is likely to be aware, or ought to be aware, of the risk to 
potential claimants of such group actions, and to be sufficiently proximate to hold a 
duty of care towards them.132  
One significant difference between this category and the first category (reliance on 
superior knowledge), is that the latter category could include cases where businesses of the 
parent and its subsidiary are completely different. A parent which produces steel and its 
subsidiary which runs construction business is such an example. If the parent knows the 
possible danger inherent in a certain type of steel and the subsidiary does not have enough 
resources to determine the danger, the parent could be responsible for utilising its superior 
knowledge to prevent accidents related to the subsidiary’s business. Another possible 
example is a holding company which does not run any business, but has superior knowledge 
and significant control over its subsidiary as to the relevant issue. 
   d)  Fairness for other reasons 
The final category is fairness for other reasons, where, instead of a weak justification for 
limited liability, there are some other factors which could cause a high degree of fairness. For 
example, when a shareholder obtained profits by utilising the company in an illegal manner, 
it is certainly unfair and unjust to grant the shareholder the benefit of limited liability. 
Therefore, claims from the company’s creditors against the shareholder should be broadly 
affirmed.  
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 There have been many cases where, although not in the context of removing limited 
liability, the corporate veil of the company, which had been used for crime and other illegal 
activities, was lifted or pierced: for example, Hare,133 DPP134 and Airbus Operations.135 
Diversion of the company’s money is another typical example. In Trustor AB,136 where the 
former director of the insolvent company forced the company to send a large amount of 
money to his controlling company, the judgment mentioned ‘impropriety’ in its justification 
for piercing the veil.137 Gencor ACP138 and Antonio Gramsci139 also affirmed veil lifting or 
piercing in the case of diversion of the company’s profits by the former director to another 
company controlled by him.  
2. Supporting empirical studies 
The four-group categorisation shown above is supported by the empirical study of ‘veil-
lifting’ cases in the United States. Since it is said that ‘veil-lifting’ is more likely to be 
affirmed in the US than in the UK,140 a certain proportion of US ‘veil-lifting’ cases would be 
dealt with by the direct liability regime if they were tried in the UK.  
 Matheson’s investigation demonstrates that ‘veil-lifting’ occurred in 31.86% out of 
929 cases since 1990.141 Additionally, ‘fraud/misrepresentation’ and ‘control’ were discussed 
in about half of the cases and, if these factors were found, ‘veil-piercing’ was affirmed in 
88.2% and 76.4% of cases respectively.142 ‘Undercapitalisation’ was discussed in nearly one-
third of cases and, if this factor was found, ‘veil-piercing’ was recognised in 76.9% of cases, 
particularly in 78.8% of cases where the shareholder had withdrawn profits from the 
company.143 ‘Unfairness/injustice’ was discussed in 28.53% of cases and, if this factor was 
found, ‘veil-piercing’ was affirmed in 93.5% of cases.144  
 Thompson had previously conducted a similar investigation.145 He analysed 1583 US 
cases prior to 1990 with the following findings. The percentage of the cases in which ‘veil-
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lifting’ was affirmed is 40.18%.146 ‘Veil-piercing’ was affirmed in 94.08% of the 169 
‘misrepresentation’ cases, in 73.33% of the 120 ‘undercapitalisation’ cases, in 56.99% of the 
551 ‘domination and control’ cases and in 81.40% of the 43 ‘overlap in business activity’ 
cases.147 These results evidently correspond to the categorisation attempted in this section. 
In the UK, Mitchell investigates 290 cases prior to 1998, although he does not analyse the 
reasons why ‘veil-piercing’ was affirmed.148 In terms of the shareholdings of company, he 
demonstrates that ‘veil-lifting’ is the least likely to occur in the case of subsidiaries (40.00% 
of cases) compared to that of companies closely controlled by human shareholders (54.31% 
of cases) and even that of companies which have dispersed ownership by human shareholders 
(48.33% of cases).149 As to the type of claim, ‘veil-lifting’ is less likely to occur in the case of 
tortious liability (27.78% of cases) than that of contractual liability (42.86% of cases).150 
Similar tendencies can also be seen in the US according to the observations of Matheson and 
Thompson.151 
The findings that ‘veil-piercing’ is more likely to occur in cases involving closely 
controlled companies as opposed to dispersed-ownership companies are supported by the 
discussion on the justification of limited liability presented above. On the other hand, the 
findings that ‘veil-piercing’ is less likely to occur in cases involving corporate shareholders 
and tort creditors than in those involving either individual shareholders or contractual 
creditors apparently contradict the discussion above. However, this apparent contradiction 
could be resolved with reference to the facts that: (1) in the case of individual shareholders 
and contractual creditors, it is more likely that shareholders’ opportunism occurs, which 
could easily induce ‘veil-piercing’; (2) there could be a selection bias in the cases involving 
corporate shareholders and tort creditors because they are more likely to be published due to 
social attention; and (3) in these cases the parties are more likely to refuse the settlement and 
demand the judgment for their emotional satisfaction.152 
 
G. CONCLUSION 
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This article clarified, with reference to theoretical justification of limited liability, that the 
situations where limited liability should be removed can be categorised in three groups: ex 
ante opportunism, ex post opportunism, and involuntary creditors. The former two categories 
have already been substantially covered by existing UK law. The remaining category of 
involuntary creditors could be dealt with appropriately by Chandler’s direct tortious liability 
regime if the regime is refined to be more flexible. Specifically, Caparo’s three requirements, 
namely foreseeability, proximity and fairness, should be considered in an integrated manner, 
and the justification for limited liability should be considered as the requirement of fairness in 
each case. If the degree of fairness in that case is high because, for example, the case involves 
a private company, and an involuntary creditor in a broad sense or misleading information 
during the initial transaction, then the level of foreseeability and proximity required should be 
relatively low. With these refinements, Chandler’s direct tortious liability regime will be able 
to deal with a variety of cases involving involuntary creditors appropriately without any 
legislation. Furthermore, this article categorised the circumstances in which the parent’s 
direct tortious liability could be recognised into four groups, namely reliance on superior 
knowledge, confusing representation, business integration and fairness for other reasons, 
although these are not exhaustive. This categorisation demonstrated that the validity of the 
direct tortious liability regime could not be denied due to ambiguity.  
In the near future, it is anticipated that the accumulation of relevant judgments and discussion 
will further establish the legal certainty of this regime. It is also anticipated that practical 
attempts in the manner in which rules of evidence are formed and applied, including 
appropriate inference of facts, will be made to overcome the difficulties in operating this 
regime, such as the uneven distribution of relevant evidence. Through these efforts, the 
refined direct tortious liability regime is expected to supplement ‘veil-piercing’ to a 
significant extent. 
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